as a network of sequential events and decisions [Veblen 18981. Veblen's theory on the decisionmaking apparatus of higher education (Veblen 1957, which will be summarized below, is the third theoretical leg of the surveyor's tripod used for the observations in this article.
The purpose of this research is to accomplish the following: h t , to extend the conceptual framework of transorganizational research through the Social Fabric Matrix and Digraph [Hayden 1982a and 1982bl . The literature on transorganizational research is found under topics such as interorganizational organization in sociology, directorship interlocks in economics, and organizational structure in management studies. Second, to apply the extended framework to corporate translocks in the state of Nebraska. Consistent with the work of Bert M. Evans [Evans 19801 and John R. Munkirs [Munkirs 19851 , this see tion will articulate the integration of Nebraska's centrally coordinated planning system that results from the integration of private corporations. The articulation will include the determination of what Evans called the "dominant core" corporations-what Munkirs designated the "central planning core" (CPC). Third, the Nebraska CPC (NCPC) data base is used in conjunction with Veblen's thesis on decisionmaking in higher education, to analyze the relationship between the NCPC and the University of Nebraska.
Overlap Among Organhtions
As the social sciences have attempted to move beyond self-actional and interactional modeling to transactional modeling, an important concern has been how to model the overlap or relationships among organizations. Although the prefix "inter" is a misnomer in a transactional world, this literature is sometimes referred to as dealing with "interorganizational organizations." Those employing self-action models assumed that the behavior of entities or agents is determined by inner drives, or motives, or rational utility calculations. With interactional (inter means between) models, it was assumed that the actions and reactions among entities determine reality. Most interaction models followed the equilibrium models of Newtonian physics, where entities are balanced against each other, the antiquated model of the interaction and balance between supply and demand is an example. Transactional (trans means across) models are based on the more recent knowledge that proscriptive and prescriptive criteria, customs, and control organizations are across and above the entities and guide the behavior of those entities in non-isomorphic fields. In a transac-tional, or holistic setting, the social organizations as well as their integration linkages (connectives, locks) are created and maintained by the actions, rules, and customs that are across the particular entities of the system. Reality is not disintegrated; it is scientists who reduce the world to disintegrated units with self-actional and interactional models. More recently, the scientific job has been discovering how to model transactional systems and holistic networks.
The psychologist, Arthur Bentley, and the economist, John R Commons, were two early scholars who developed applied transactional analysis. John R. Commons defined transactions as the smallest economic unit that can be regularly observed for scientific puposes. Thus, when he observed the transaction of buying and selling, it was not to give extraordinary meaning to the price artifact, but rather to take account of judicial, social, psychological, political, economic, energy, and natural components both across and determining the transaction of buying and selling [Commons 19681 .
Sociologists Huseyin Leblebici and Gerald Salancik, in their analysis of the Chicago Board of Trade, began with Commons's concepts. Their study reports how stability of transactions is achieved through transorganizational working rules. They found that "from the view of a theory of organization, this implies that the exchange transactions observed in any interorganizational field are not solely under the control and discretion of exchange partners themselves, but are the product of collective rule making which produces order out of conflict and mutuality" [Leblebici and !hlancik 1982, p. 2411. Commons found that for transactions to proceed, there must be a collective guarantor to the transaction. "Because of this need for the guarantor, a transaction is not a result of the exchange between two parties,. . . but rather the result of the collective powers" Dblebici and Salancik 1982, p. 2291 .
The modeling of the transactional relationships among organizations can by guided by a number of different methodological approaches.
The institutionalist approach is one of overlap of the process and decisionmaking of related organizations. The environment around any organization is itself made up of other organizations. Thus, the overlap itself is an institutional entity and of scientific interest to thle institutional researcher [See: Bush 1983 and . The organizations are not separate; they are provided with functions, criteria, and decisionmakers that integrate the overlapping organizations. The srnrcture and process of each organization is part of other organizations. In this article, the institutional and transactional approach will be used.
Consistent with such utilization, terms to designate linkages, locks, deliveries, and connectives will, when prefixed, be prefixed with "transw rather than "interw in order to be consistent with transactional analysis. The etymology and specification of the prefix "inter" is inconsistent with the manner and means through which relations among organizations are established and maintained. The distinction is important with regard to policy concerns. If relationships among organizations were really limited and determined by those organizations, they would be immune to public policy. If it is, however, understood and designated that the functioning of relationships depends on the transactional beliefs, criteria, customs, policies, laws, and rules that exist across and outside the particular organizational transaction, then it is possible to redesign those transactions through public policy. As John Dewey and Arthur Bentley stated, "naming does things. It states. To state, it must both conjoin and disjoin, identify as distinct and identify as co~ected" [Dewey and Bentley 1949, p. 1331 . If the naming is inconsistent with the identification of what is known, the misdesigdon will encourage the development of policy inconsistent with scientific findings.
Relevant Corporate Transorganizational Literature
The "interorganizational organizationw literature in sociology dates back to at least the 1800s, and includes studies on fhmilies, corporations, markets, government agencies, military confederations, classes and so forth. An important part of that literature deals with the overlap of corporations, especially the exchange of directors among corporate boards. What has been missing in such studies, according to Charles J. Fombrun, has been an integrated transactional, or holistic, approac3 for understanding and modeling the MI sociostructure "as h s struggle to manage their common fate" pombrun 1986, p. 41 11.
In his book, The Transformation of American Capitalism, John Munkirs argues, consistent with Evans, that most of the production and distribution decisions in the American economy are not made by the invisible hand of the market, but by a small number of closely linked corporations wunkirs 19851. Munkirs traces the evolution of the American economy from the birth of industrial trusts after the Civil War to the present day economy, dominated by "centralized private sector planning" (CPSP). At the center of the CPSP process is a small number of large banks and insurance corporations, which Munkirs labels the "central planning core" (CPC) . The CPC possesses an impressive array of both formal and informal planning instruments with which to coordinate and direct economic activity. Formal planning instruments available to the CPC include shared stock and debt ownership and overlapping boards of directors. Informal planning instruments, which serve as a network of informational conduits among CPC corporations, include legal and financial services such as shared trustees, registrars, and transfer agents. The CPC delivers information and direction through these collective planning instruments to corporations in vital industrial, transportation, and retail sectors of the economy. What emerges fiom this private centrally planned process is a technologically, financially, and administratively overlapping group of large corporations.
Munkirs developed and organized a substantial data base for his Munkirs's work leaves us with a general theory regarding the impor-,tance of centralized patterns in organizational overlap, and with methods to meet Fombrun's call for modeling the complex constructs of full sociostmctures. Our goal is to refine the concept of organizational overlap, and to explain methods which can be used to identi6 and derive centralized patterns of overlap.
Overlap and Reachability Concepts
Conceptually, the concern is with the overlapping sets that define the network and delivery process. This can be explained with the use of the simple digraph (directed graph) in F ' i 1. Assume that E,F,G,H, and I are five organizations-five different corporations in this case. Corporations can make various kinds of deliveries to each other. In this case we will be concerned with the delivery of directors. The deliveries among the organizations, for example djrectors D, through D,in Figure  1 , are an important part of their transorganizational relationships. The importance, or central position, of any corporation would depend on the number of Werent kinds of transorganizational sets in which the corporation is involved, and on the number of deliveries within each set. If two corporations each send one director to the other's board, the degree of overlap would be less than if the same corporations shared four directors. We are specifying three different kinds of organizational overlap sets. They are primary, secondary, and tertiary sets, which are demonstrated in Figure 1 with the use of dotted lines to outline the different sets.
Primary Overlap: A primary corporate translock 0 is outlined in Figure 1 with the rectangle around E and F. (Appendix A contains a glossary of acronyms and symbols for the reader's convenience.) As in-dicated, director D, serves on the boards of corporations E and F. Corporation E is involved in one PCT with F and has one primary director translock (PDT). The PDT indicates the delivery level (number delivered). Although not outlined by a dotted line in Figure 1 , other FXX sets include those between G and F, F and H, and H and I. Corporation G, for example, has one PCT and three PDTs with corporation F. With a primary overlap, the directors on the two governing boards meet together at each other's board meetings to plan together for the two corporations involved.
Secondary Overlap: A secondary corporate translock (SCT) is outlined in Figure 1 by a set (enclosed by a triangle) which includes corporations F,H, and I. Corporation I has a SCT with corporation F through corporation H. This example of a SCT has three secondary director translocks (SDTs), which are D, D,, and D, Other SCT sets in Figure 1 include E with G and G with H. With a secondary overlap, the directors ox! the two governing boards are still meeting together face-to-fkce in planning sessions on a third governing board, which has an overlapping interest in the two SCT corporations. There are direct planning relationships between the two companies, and the directors involved have direct face-to-h reachability with regird to decisions in a deliberative setting.
Tertiary Overlap:
A tertiary corporate translock ( T o is outlined in Figure 1 by a dotted line set that includes corporations E,F,H, and I. Corporation E has a TCT with corporation I through corporation F and H. This example of a TCT has four tertiary director translocks (TDTs). They are Dj, D, D, and D7. Unlike primary and secondary corporate overlaps, there are not necessarily direct &ce-to-face relationships at a governing board meeting between the directors fiom E and I. To use the example in Figure 1 , after D, and D, meet at corporation F, delib erative decisions and plans, if they are to include corporation I, must take place at the board meeting of corporation H. E has reachability to I, but it can be once removed fiom direct f ce-to-f8ce planning deliberations, as indicated in Figure 1 . Another TCT in Figure 1 is G with I though F and H, with six TDTs. The TDTs are Dj, D, D, and D , Figure 1 is, of course, too limited to portray all the various sets of corporations in a real world context. We can observe fiom F i i 1, however, that corporation F is a central organbation in the process network. It is involved in more organizational overlap sets, and has more reachability to other corporations, and a greater level of deliveries, in terms of directors, than any other corporation. It lies in the intersection of all three sets.
Extension with the Social Matrix and Digraph
The Social Fabric Matrix (SFM) can be used to extend the organhation overlap concepts and to apply the concepts to the complex and redundant overlaps of the real world. To explain this application of the SFM, corporations A, B, C, J, and K are arrayed along both sides of the matrix in Figure 2 , and the delivery of directors from one corporation to another corporation is indicated in the cells. For example, corporation A delivers its board member X to the board of corporation B, and member Z to corporation J. As another example, C delivers Y to B, Z to J, and two members, N and M are sent to K The rows and columns can be aggregated as in Figure 2 , and thus the various overlaps defined above are specified in the matrix as follows: PCP The total PCT' s a corporation has with other corporations is the total number of cells with entries in the corporation's row in the SFM. For example, the row total for cell entries for corporation C is 3.
PDT: The total PDTs involved in a corporations PCTs is the total number of directors in a corporations row. For example, the row total for directors for corporation C is 4.
SCP The total SCTs a corporation has with other corporations is the total number of cells with entries, less 1, in the column, for columns with a corporation's director delivery to a FCT. For example, the total SCTs for corporation A can be found by the aggregation of the cell entries of columns 2 and 4, less 1 for each column. Or, corporation A is involved in 5 SCTs [(3-1)+(4-1)=5]. To find the SCTs for A, read across the row from left to right (as indicated with the directed dashed line). In column 2, director X from A is serving on the board of B (a PCT). If we read down, it will be discovered that corporations C and J also deliver Y and N respectively to the board of B. Thus, A has a SCT with C and another with J through B. Because B is the direct PCT through which the SCTs with C and J are accomplished, it is not counted in the total. A similar SCT case exists in column 4.
SDR The total SDTs participating in a corporation's STCs is the total number of directors in the column that contains a corporation's de- livery of directors to a PCT. For example, the total SDT for corporation A can be found by the aggregation of the cell entries of columns 2 and 4, for a total of 7. To find the SDT total for A, read across the row fiom left to right. In column 2, director X serves on the board of B. All of the directors in column 2 are members of the SDT. A similar SDT case exists in column 4, in which there are four SDTs.
TCT: The total TCTs to which a corporation belongs is the total number of cells with entries, less 1, for rows in which there is a corporation with which the original corporation has an SCT. For example, the total TCTs for corporation A can be found by the aggregation of the cell entries, less 1, for each row, for rows 3 and 4. Or, stated differently, corporation A participated in 5 T m s [(3-1)+(4-1)=5] through corporation B. To find a TCT for A, read across row 1 (still following the directed dashed line) fiom left to right to a PTC (column 2), go down that column to a S m , and then aggregate all the cell entries in that row (row 3) minus 1. The 1 is subtracted in that row for the SCT through which the TCT is formed. A similar TCT case exists for row 4. This calculation would need to be repeated (not indicated by dashed lines in Figure 2 ) for each SCT through corporation J in column 4 to obtain the total number of TCTs for corporation A, or 5 TCTs [(3-l)+(3-1)+ (2-1)=5]. Thus, the total TCTs for corporation A is 10, [5+5] .
TDF The total TDTs are the total number of directors in the TCT rows plus the number of directors in the PCT cell from which each TCT originates. For example, the total for corporation A is 23. To find the TCT total for A, read across the row fiom left to right. There is 1 director in PCX cell (1,2). Reading down from cell (1,2), row 3 has 4 directors plus the 1 director in cell (1,2). A similar process is followed for row 4. Reading down fiom cell (1,4), row 2 has 3 directors plus the 1 director in cell (1'4) fiom which the TCT in row 2 originates. A similar process is followed for rows 3 and 5. Thus [(4+ 1) 
The matrix in Figure 2 is laid out in digraph format in Figure 3 , which clarifies reachability and redundancy. By observing Figure 3 , it is more obvious that corporation A reached J through numerous channels-with a direct PCT, with a SCT through B, and with a TCT through B and C. These redundant linkages enhance the opportunity for the decisions and plans to be made conjointly and implemented effectively. Numerous corporations govern in a manner that relies on corporation J effectively maintaining the plan coordinated with corporation A, and the directors from those corporations who sit on the governing board of J emphasize that reliance. These are redundant reinforcement channels. Equally important, all those corporations reach A. Stated differently, A reaches itself indirectly through these linkages. At first blush this statement may sound irrelevant. Yet, upon reflection, it means that the directors delivered to A' s board fiom other wrporations can remind A of A' s original decisions and their reliance on the original decisions, and thereby reinforce the plan that leads to continuity of the economic process. This planning transmission cycle is consistent with the institutional theory of cumulative circular causation. To articulate the network process of organization overlap among private corporations in Nebraska, we began by collecting for each corporation the names of directors and officers, the value of assets and sales, and the names of the law firms and accounting firms used by each corporation.' After an arduous and lengthy search, such data were collected on 348 Nebraska corporations.
Pattern of Nebraska Corporate Overlap
Early in the data collection process, it became apparent fiom casual observation that there is considerable overlap among the governing boards of Nebraska corporations. Computer assistance made it possible to select only corporations having at least one PCT. Next, to discover the pattern of the overlapping governing boards, the corporations with at least one PCX were entered into a Social Fabric Matrix (as explained above). The list included 100 corporations, thus requiring a matrix of 100 rows and 100 columns. The number of directors fiom each corporation that serves on another board were entered into the relevant matrix cells, and the PCTs, PDTs, SCTs, SDTs, TCTs, and TDTs were aggregated in the type of matrix explained above and illustrated in Figure 2 . 2 The results of the aggregation, for those corporations with four or more PCTs, are rank ordered in columns 1 and 2 of In determining director deliveries among boards, board members of subsidiary corporations were included as members of the parent corporation's board. This was one in order to not multiply the apparent number of translocks of particular boards and members. Board members fiom the parent company are often on the subsidiary board. We did not consider that arrangement as constituting a separate corporate overlap because these members all belong to the same corporation. Had such internal deliveries of board members been counted, the totals in Table 1 At this point in our analysis, it is apparent that Nebraska has a centralized private sector planning (CPSP) system similar to that found by
Munkirs for the national economy wunkirs 19851. Some differences are also apparent. For those familiar with Munkirs's findings, one a p parent difference is that the Nebraska system is more centralized than the national system in the distribution of direct board of directors translocks and in the board members involved in the translocks. Nebraska's PCTs and PDTs are both less equally distributed than at the national level. However, the centricity of the system and reachability within the system, rather than differences with the national system, are the interests in this article.
Nebraska Central Planning Core
The criterion used to determine the corporations that make up the Nebraska Central Planning Core (NCPC) is the degree of reachability of a corporation to the dominant corporations at the center of the core decision network. From Table 1 , it is clear that FirsTier Financial, Lincoln Telecommunications, First Commerce Bmcshares, and Ameritas Life Insurance are the top four corporations with the most connections in PCT, SCT, and TCT categories. In addition, all four have a PCT with the other three. Because these four corporations are the most central, the other corporations in Table 1 are ranked with respect to their reachability to these central corporations. Some corporations listed in Table 1 were deleted from consideration as a NCPC corporation because of their relatively small size.3 In addition, some corporations, such as IBP and Pegler-Sysco, were deleted from consideration because it was the authors' assessment that the major decisions for those corporations were made outside Nebraska. IBP is a subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum and the national corporate headquarters of Pegler-Sysco is in Houston, Texas.
The final list of corporations comprising the NCPC are in Table 2 along with the total number of various types of translock sets by which each corporation reached the four leaders. For example, in the case of Valmont, FirsTier is reached through a PCT, 5 SCTs and 17 TCTs. After determining the connections to the four central corporations, the lock sets are weighted by assigning each PCT a weight of 5, each SCT the weight of 3, and each TCT the weight of 1. 4 The total, determined by multiplying the number of PCTs, SCTs, and TCTs by their respective weights, is found in the final column of Figure 4 , and in the NCPC Social Fabric Digraph contained in Figure 5 . The deliveries are found by reading the SFM across ftom left to right. For example, as indicated in row 1, FirsTier delivers 4 directors (4 PDT's) to Woodmen, 3 to ConAgra, 3 to Valmont, and so forth. The total PCTs for each corporation within the core is found in column 16 and their total PDTs within the core are found in column 17. By adding each column, less one, where FirsTier has a PCT, the total SDTs in the core can be determined for FirsTier. For example, in Column 14, the director delivered from FirsTier to Lincoln Telecommunications (cell 1,14) meets with directors who also serve as directors of First Commerce Bane shares, Ameritas Life, Woodmen, and so forth, because directors fiom those corporations also serve on Lincoln Telecommunication's board.
To find the TDTs, as explained earlier in Figure 2 , one would read left and right from each SDT. For example, FirsTier's SDT in cell (3,14) also allows FirsTier to reach Norwest Nebraska in cell (3,2) to provide information and influence on a tertiary basis.
The translock network among these central core corporations is easier to conceptualize by observing Figure 5 . In Figure 5 the nodes are the component corporations and the edges (lines) are the deliveries of directors. Since the director delivery is in both directions, only one line with an arrow on each end is used. For example, if two corporations, such as FirsTier and First Commerce Bancshares, both have a director serve on the other's board, that is indicated with one edge. Numbers are used in Figure 5 to represent the director's names. That number and the name to which it corresponds are found in Appendix B. The names of directors are included in order that readers may correct us if the public documents from which the data base is compiled are inaccurate, and in order to allow others to complete a surname analysis.
These corporations exchange governing board members, plan together on each others' boards, and exchange information through direct and indirect linkages and planning functions. Within the NCPC, 13 of the 15 members deliver a president or CEO to other core corporations.
In addition, although the data base is not contained in this article, some keep deposits with each other, serve as each others' agents, and own each others' stock. Because these corporations are highly integrated, the welfare of one affects the welfare of others. Thus, it is a system of mutual advantage recognized arrangements, to use Bert Evans's term, through which they (legally and systematically) plan together. They do not belong to a competitive system of decentralized, independent Eree enterprise. They belong to a centralized private sector planning system, to use John Munkirs's term, of which they are the central core members. We see that the NCPC is closely integrated in its decisionmaking functions and is an information diffusion system. Through this network, and through their numerous overlaps with other Nebraska corporations (see Table I ), these corporations can diffuse their plans across the corporate board structure of the Nebraska economy.
Tke ~ebrasku CPC and the Unimity of Nebrasku
Next we will use Thorstein Veblen's ideas relevant to university administration as a guide to relate the Nebraska CPC to the administration of the University of Nebraska. Veblen's relevant work on the subject is his book, The Higher Learning in America: A Memorandum on the Conduct of Universities by Business Men [Veblen 19571 . The subtitle is the important aspect for our purposes here. (Especially relevant to the Nebraska case is the use of the word "Men.")5
Veblen found the maxims that guided the major universities of his day did not lead them to be in the senrice of science and scholarship, but rather, the maxims that guided their conduct were those found in the marketplace and the world of pecuniary gain. The reason their conduct was so directed was because the universities were dominated by governing boards made up of businessmen and university presidents with powem positions. Therefore, the "aims and methods of the scholars and schools devoted to the higher learning" [Veblen 1957, p. 31 are found to be influenced by the "habitual pursuit of business in modern times" [Veblen 1957, p. 31. The university administrative apparatus reflected the seadarkation of the United States by the substitution of laymen for clergymen on the governing boards. Veblen wrote, "the substitution is a substitution of businessmen and politicians; which amounts to saying that it is a substitution of businessmen. So that the discretionary control in matters of university policy now rests finally in the hands of businessmen" [Veblen 1957, p. 461. He found that "poor men and men without large experience in business a f b h are felt to have no place in these bodies" [Veblen 1957, p. 581. The power of the purse gives the governing boards the power to establish the beliefs and criteria to guide the university, and "the fact is that businessmen hold the plenary direction, and that business principles guide them in their management of the a&rirs of the higher learning. . . " [Veblen 1957, p. 571 . The academic administrator is "vested with somewhat autocratic powers" [Veblen 1957, p. 591 by the board and "he is in effect responsible to the governing board alone" [Veblen 1957, p. 591 and therefore the mind set of the board; a mind set which does not habitually look beyond the "interest of commercial gain and the commonplaces of commercial routine and political bravado" [Veblen 1957 [Veblen , p. 1741 Veblen found that business boards, as a rule, "will be carell to give their general manager full discretion, and not to hamper him with too close an accounting of the details of his administration, so long as he shows gratifjing results. He must be a strong man; that is to say, a capable man of afkirs, tenacious and resourcell in turning the mews at hand to account for this purpose, and easily content to let the end justify the means" [Veblen 1957, p. 661. The fierce campaign of aspirants for executive office in universities tests their qwdiilcations against the standards expected by the board, and tests their strength under pres-sure. "These boards are made up of well-to-do businessmen, with a penchant for popular notability; and the qualifications necessary to put in evidence by aspirants for executive o5ce are such as will convince such a board of their serviceability" [Veblen 1957 [Veblen , p. 1801 . There are many more candidates willing to serve such boards than positions available; thus, the aspirant9s trial under fire provides a process to prove his aggressiveness and strength.
In point of fact, here as in political office-seeking, the most active factor that goes to decide the selection of the eventual incumbents of oftice is a tenacious aggressive self-selection. With due, but by no means large, allowance for exceptions, the incumbents are chosen fiom among a self-selected body of candidates, each of whom has, in the common run of cases, been resolutely in pursuit of such an oftioe for some appreciable time, and has spent much time and endeavor on fitting himself for its duties. Commonly it is only after the aspirant has achieved a settled reputation of eligibility and a predilection for the office that he will finally secure appointment [Veblen 1957 [Veblen , p. 1791 This was the university decision model that Veblen observed at the turn of the century for the major U.S. universities. Universities have, of come, changed considerably since that time in some ways consistent with, and, in other ways, in response to Veblen9s suggestions and criticism. Veblen, however, was not modeling state universities. They were , not the major universities early in this century.
The NCPCflU Social Fabric M a t r i x
As we saw above, the decisionmaking institutions of the corporate -.business community have evolved to a new process since the time of Veblen. We should also expect that the relationship between modem state universities and the new business complex has also changed. Because the CPC is the dominant core of business decisions in the centrally private sector planning system, we might expect that a university's connection with the business community would be through the CPC. We will begin testing such a hypothesis by determining the relationships between the NCPC and the University of Nebraska (NU).
To outline the extent of such overlap, NU is added to the SFM of the NCPC found in Figure 4 above. The new SFM with NU included is found in Figure 6 , and the digraph expressing the matrix of Figure  6 , as a directed graph, is found in Figure 7 . These entries are displayed in Figure 7 . The digraph in Figure 7 indicates the number of UDs (a UD being a person who is both a NU official and a NCPC corporate director). Following the indication of the number of UDs are the numbers that correspond to the person's name in Appendix B. By adding NU to the NCPC matrix and digraph, the substantial degree to which the University is corn& to the 15 core corporations, and the extent of their director deliveries, become clear. NU has more primary translocks than any other corporation in the matrix: there are 37 corporate officials involved in 1 1 primary translocks.
In comparison, FirsTier, as the highest ranking corporation in primary translocks, has fewer the NU. FirsTier has 32 officials involved in 11 primary translocks. The highest number of primary locks between any two institutions occurs between FirsTier and NU. There are 1 1. Excluding the University, the greatest number of PCTs between two corporations is 4. Of the 15 corporations that comprise the NCPC, 73 percent deliver at least 1 director to NU. The NCPC also provides almost 50 percent of the directors to the University of Nebraska Foundation Board of Directors, and holds 50 percent of the foundation committee chairships.
The overlap articulated here between the NCPC and NU should not be considered exhaustive. First, if documents that are not public could be accessed, there may be additional direct exchanges. Second, if additional corporations, beyond those in the core, were included in the matrix, additional connections between NU and the NCPC, through ~econdary and tertiary connections, would be articulated Third, if different kinds of organizations, for example law firms, in addition to business corporations were included in the matrix, additional reachability between the CPC and NU would be defined. An example is the law firm of Cline, Williams, W r i g h t , Johnson and Oldfather (Cline, Williams) . Its clients include NU and FirsTier Bank. In 1988 In -1989 This statement clarifies that it was not UN-L faculty or administrators who initiated the idea. Beyond initiating the idea, ConAgra helped set goals for the state university program. In addition, ConAgra, along with the NCPC directors who dominate the University Foundation, committed funding for the ~r0gra.m.~
Conchding Obsentmio~s
This article extends the conceptual and applied analysis on the overlap of organizations by using the Social Fabric Matrix. From this endeavor, our concluding observations are as follows.
First, the application of the SF'M extends the conceptuaI and applied knowledge base on overlaps in a number of ways. It provides a method for explicitly specifying the primary, secondary, and tertiary overlaps. Thus, it allows for a more complete organization of data for analysis.
By using the SFM to ferret out these overlap sets, the large number of secondary and tertiary translocks, not previously discovered, are specified The SFM and its concomitant digraph allows for the description of the decision network that Veblen thought was necessary for m w theoretical work to be completed. The SF'M digraph allows us to give more precision to the concept of process; in this case, the decision process among corporations. By specifjing the decision network, the question with regard to the set of beliefs, myths, ideologies, and their legal expressions that guide the process pattern presents itself perforce. For policy purposes, the SFM must be expanded in the future to include these entities.
All systems experience hierarchical arrangements that have to be articulated for the system to be understood. The SFM approach allows us to find the decision hierarchy by identifj.ing both the central corporations and the reachability paths for information to be diffused from those corporations. Too many corporate overlap studies have ignored hierarchy and the central core corporations. By treating all corporations the same (of equal importance), the findings in the studies lose validity. For example, a number of studies have been completed on whether broken ties between corporations are reconstituted with the same firm. Most have ignored the hierarchy within the network by comparing total ties to reconstituted ties. However, Linda Steams and Mark Mizuchi found that reconstitution is a function of the corporation's power in the network [Steams and Mizuchi 1986, p. 5361 . Thus, distinctions must be made with regard to a corporation's position in the hierarchy before other distinctions can be tested. "All social systems-hence, all organizations--exist in an institutional environment that defines and delimits social reality. . . . To neglect their presence and power is to ignore significant causal factors shaping organizational structures and practices: to overlook these variables is to misspeGifL our causal models" [Scott 1987, pp. 507-81. The SFM approach does not prejudge where the center lies. In Nebraska, the CPC included corporations involved in banking, insurance, communications, food processing, equipment production, investment, transportation, and so forth. The SFM method determines the central core and the degree of reachability to the core, rather than forcing investigators to hypothesize the core.
Yngve Ramstad has stated that institutionalist knowlwe gains plausibility and validation as it is validated in different contexts [Ramstad 1986 [Ramstad , pp. 1072 . The findings in this article are a "real type." The real type is the Nebraska context and the findings are consistent with Munkirs's real type findings in the national context. This strengthens the theory [Ramstad 1986, p. 10721 . The next step, according to Ramstad, is to capture linkages and connections between the two contexts in order to constitute the system's unity and wholeness. "These specific linkages are what contribute to the system's uniqueness" [Ramstad 1986, p. 10721 . This article uncovers how to begin sped& that linkage. The linkage between the national CPC and NCPC, it appears, is accomplished by national and global corporations, such as IBP and ConAgra, which are linked to both the national and local systems.
With regard to the relationship between a modem state university and a state CPC, it is evident that the integration and overlap between the two is much more pervasive and complex than the simple relationship Veblen described as existing between governing boards and administrators early in this century. To correspond with Veblen's findings for the private university, we might have expected the NCPC to have overlapped extensively with the Board of Regents at NU. However, the NCPC is not integrated into NU' S decisionmaking through NU' S elected Board of Regents. Only one Regent held a position with a NCPC corporation. He held a position with a subsidary of a NCPC corporation. The integration of the NCPC and NU is accomplished by directors fiom NCPC corporations holding an extensive variety of decisionmaking positions at NU, they include Foundation committee members, the University President, Chancellors of UN-L and UN-0, Vice Chancellor, Athletic Director, Foundation Board of Directors, and so forth. They are in positions to influence the major decisions of the University. Corporate influence no longer obtrudes itselffrom outside into the university. It has become internalized within the university as academic administrators become active participants in the central planning core. Thus, the pecuniary logic now dominatesfrom within the institution of higher learning. Whether this can be considered a general model, or just a special Nebraska case, will not be known until similar research is completed in other states with other state universities.
The findings in Nebraska also make us rethink where the center of the CPC may reside, especially at the regional level. The traditional statement about power is that power is dependent on a combination of wealth, violence, and knowledge. We would probably all find fault with the statement. For example, most of us would want technology and organization to be included. Whatever the final set of determinants of power we might agree upon, knowledge would be included. We also know that in a modem society, knowledge has become more important than the other d e t e h t s . This means that a knowledge center such as the university will become of greater interest to any organization seeking power. Thus, we could surmise that the university will become more integrated with the prominent core organbations of society. The questions of how the university overlaps with any societal institution it serves, and how a democracy can determine the answers to those questions require that serious attention be given to organizational overlap. Fombrun, in 1986, stated that we needed to recognize that "structure is a complex construct whose disaggregation in extant research has artificially compartmentalized complementary aspects of organization." He believed that theories of structure had artificially segregated various streams of organizational research. He stated that structure should be understood to be a configuration of infrastructure, sociostructure, and superstructure. "Thus within organizations, structure is a n edifice resting on the intrastructural foundation of a technological solution to the production problem, framed by a sociostructure of interactions, around which crystallizes a set of superstructural norms and values" [Fombrun 1986, 406; emphasis added] . Fombrun seemed to be unaware of the works of Bert M. Evans and John R. Munkirs that had already established corporate transorganizational approaches.
I
For years Professor Evans taught a t the University of Nebrask a that the economy of the United States is a corporate enterprise economy and not a free enterprise economy. I t is an economy which is planned a t the center, by what Fombrun referred to a s the sociostructure corporations. According to Evans, that sociostructure of large banks and insurance companies overlaps with the production infrastructure to guide the producers a t the national and the local levels.
One of Evans' professors a t Harvard, Edward H. Chamberlain, developed the theory of monopolistic competition about which he stated, in 1933, that most industries had evolved to a point that they were dominated by a few firms. These firms, Chamberlain stated, without overt collusion or organizational overlap, recognized their interdependence; and thus, in their pricing, production and distribution policies, each corporation took into consideration the reaction of others to its own decisions. Chamberlain indicated that this system of mutual dependence recognized led to problems such as monopoly pricing, unemployment, and economic waste [Chamberlain 19621. Evans followed the lead of another of his professors, John K Galbraith, who had found the corporate sector in the U.S. to be planned [Galbraith 19671 . In his own work, Evans observed that the system had evolved beyond one of mutual dependence recognized to one of mutual advantage recognized a.rrangements among corporations. Corporations were no longer just recognizing other corporations. They had evolved to a point of arranging for pervasive overlapping decision making and planning for their mutual advantage. Evans referred to this as a corporate enterprise system, as opposed to the free enterprise system of an earlier era. The corporate enterprise system "does not compete in ' the old-fashioned economic sense. Rather the economic struggles center, around strategies for control. . . ." [Evans 1980, 21 . "It isn't competition-it is the mutual adoption and standardization of methods of avoiding the effects of competition" [1980,61. Evans divided his explanation into two historical stages. "Stage one became a matter of business stabilization through mutual accommodation within the industrial family" 11980, 101. These industrial families "shared markets and adopted product and pricing patterns . . . " [1980, 71. Stage two of the corporate enterprise system developed as overlapping arrangements across industries acquired a larger share of the growing national product.
The multi-national, dominant core, shared monopoly groups. . . looked a t each other and saw that in some cases one industrial' or product line group or another received a bigger piece of the bigger pie than themselves. It became apparent to these industrial or business groups that it wasn't enough to protect themselves within the group. Mutual advantage recognized arrangements worked within the group; but each saw the need for a strategy to secure a larger piece of the growing pie [1980,81. According to Evans a central core, whose regular practices had not solidified (although he believed that it was dominated by New York banks and insurance companies) gave guidance to the system. Central core decisions emanate from the collective overlap of numerous cores. "The dominant cores of the various multinational industrial or business groups collectively have set the pattern and mostly the rest of us try to survive" [1980,91. All citations are to references listed in Hayden and Stephenson [19921. 
